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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early twenty-first century, the network neutrality debate has 
been a heated discussion concerning the amount of control (network 
management) that network operators and service providers have over the 
traffic of content on their network. This debate is particularly pressing in 
light of the development of next-generation broadband infrastructures. The 
academic network neutrality discourse has taken place mainly in the United 
States. Recently, however, the debate on network neutrality has gained 
traction among European academics and regulators as well.  
There are clear differences between the U.S. and European telecom 
markets and the regulation thereof. Most clearly, Europe comes from a 
tradition of state monopolies; whereas, U.S. telecommunications operators 
have almost always been private enterprises. Late 2008 and early 2009 
have witnessed development in telecommunications policy and the network 
neutrality dispute on both sides of the Atlantic. The FCC made its landmark 
decision in the Comcast case.1 The Obama Administration is currently 
formulating its telecommunications policies. The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act’s (Recovery Act) Broadband Technology Opportunities 
Program (BTOP) underscores the Administration’s dedication to 
incentivizing development of “neutral” broadband networks throughout the 
United States.2 At the same time, European regulators are reviewing their 
regulatory framework for telecommunications, which consists of an 
elaborate set of laws applicable to all EU member states. European 
lawmakers are also in the process of developing a strategy of fostering 
broadband deployment under a comprehensible network-management 
regime.3 In fact, the ew York Times reports that European 
telecommunications reform has drawn considerable interest from U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 
F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008). 
 2. See 47 U.S.C. § 1305(j) (2009) (requiring adherence to 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005) 
for grants under the Act). 
 3. See PARL. EUR. DOC. (SEC 2007) 1472, at 90-102 [hereinafter “Impact 
Assesment”]. 
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lobbyists for the telecommunications industry.4 It would thus be a 
worthwhile endeavor to critically compare the regulatory actions of both 
the European Institutions and the U.S. Congress and FCC concerning 
network management and broadband deployment.5  
The present Article offers a critical review of U.S. and European 
telecommunications policy in relation to network neutrality and network 
management and investigates which aspects of European broadband policy 
may be worth emulating in the United States. In an attempt to minimize 
regulatory errors, European regulators in telecommunications have 
developed an analytical legal mechanism in which antitrust and sector-
specific regulation interact.6 This mechanism allows for close monitoring 
of markets under antitrust law and permits regulation in case of 
demonstrated market failure. This regulatory mechanism is slated to be 
lifted when the regulated market becomes competitive again.  
However well developed this European system may be, there are 
many relevant points for criticism. European lawmakers struggle with 
network neutrality, and weak compromises have arisen out of conflicts 
between European regulatory bodies. These compromises led to a wait-
and-see stance toward network neutrality. This Article will argue that such 
a wait-and-see policy is not the optimal approach when considering that 
broadband is a complex emerging market. Rather, a more dynamic policy 
that balances investment incentives and externalities in next-generation 
broadband is recommended.7 The European willingness to compromise 
provides an opportunity for U.S. regulators to develop a policy that broadly 
follows the European legal framework, but is better developed in terms of 
network neutrality issues. As the FCC is required to produce a national 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Kevin J. O’Brien, U.S. Lobbyists Angle for Influence in Europe's et eutrality 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/ 
technology/08iht-neutral.1.20669185.html. 
 5. See David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Governing etworks: 
Telecommunication Deregulation in Europe and the United States, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
819 (2002) (providing comparative studies on European and American telecommunications 
policy); Amit M. Schejter, ‘From All My Teachers I Have Grown Wise, and from My 
Students More than Anyone Else’: What Lessons Can the US Learn from Broadband 
Policies in Europe? 71 INT’L COMM. GAZETTE 429 (2009). See also Rebecca Wong & 
Daniel B. Garrie, etwork eutrality: Laissez-Faire Approach or ot?, 34 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 315 (2008) (offering a specific and comparative study on network 
neutrality in the EU and United States). 
 6. See generally Damien Geradin & Michel Kerf, Controlling Market Power in 
Telecommunications: Antitrust vs Sector-specific Regulation (2008). 
 7. See Pietro Crocioni, Leveraging of Market Power in Emerging Markets: A Review 
of Cases, Literature, and a Suggested Framework, 4 J. OF COMPETITION L. & ECON. 449, 512 
(2008). 
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broadband plan under the Recovery Act,8 it has ample opportunity to 
develop such a dynamic strategy to further broadband deployment 
throughout the United States. 
The structure of this Article is as follows: Section I will provide a 
short background on the network neutrality debate by examining its 
technical, legal, and economic context. To further demonstrate the 
complexity of developing a comprehensive network neutrality policy, this 
Article defines particulars of the emerging broadband market. Section II 
will examine U.S. and European telecommunications policies. This 
Article’s analysis of U.S. telecommunications policy will focus on the most 
recent events in network neutrality and network management—the 
Comcast case, the Recovery Act, and the FCC’s Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking. This Article will then discuss how Congress and the FCC 
have progressively deregulated the telecommunications sector and how 
recent developments may signal a reversal of those deregulatory 
tendencies. 
The background of European telecommunications policy will be 
discussed in order to show how the interaction between sector-specific 
regulation and antitrust has developed in the EU. Pan-European policy was 
implemented to allow for an internal, competitive European 
telecommunications market, which would fuel innovation, increase 
diversity and quality, and lower prices. This policy has largely been 
successful. The current review process of the European regulatory 
framework has attempted to address network neutrality concerns. Closer 
analysis demonstrates this preliminary European network neutrality policy 
to be too cautious, and practical problems may arise. 
However, Section III argues that, notwithstanding these practical 
problems, the European framework potentially offers an optimal approach 
for dealing with network neutrality issues and fosters development of next-
generation broadband networks. This argument finds support in U.S. and 
European telecommunications policies that relate to regulatory error costs. 
Analysis shows that, in an emerging market, such as next-generation 
broadband, not only are errors more likely to occur, but they also carry 
larger costs than in “regular” markets.9 
Through an analytical model, this Article will demonstrate that the 
European interaction of antitrust and regulation in telecommunications 
evades two common errors: false negatives and false positives.10 In the 
                                                                                                                 
 8. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115 (2009). 
 9. Crocioni, supra note 7, at 451. 
 10. For an explanation of false positives and false negatives in law, see R.S. Radford, 
Statistical Error and Legal Error: Type One and Type Two Errors and the Law, 21 LOY. 
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former, no regulation is imposed if antitrust law falls short; while in the 
latter, unnecessary regulation is implemented on an otherwise competitive 
market. Academics have debated whether false positives or false negatives 
bear the largest cost to society and on which of these errors regulatory 
intervention should focus. By building on existing models, this Article 
demonstrates that costs of both errors are not as easily offset as often 
assumed. This invalidates elemental trade offs between the two errors, 
which are especially pertinent in emerging markets. Emerging markets, 
such as broadband, do not fare well with categorical intervention against 
false-negative or false-positive errors. In order to maximize responsible 
broadband deployment, this Article argues for a flexible and dynamic 
network neutrality policy that pivots between fighting false positives and 
false negatives when necessary. The contours of such a flexible regulatory 
mechanism are present in the European framework for telecommunications, 
and a similar mechanism could be used in dealing with network neutrality 
issues in the United States. 
This Article thus recommends that U.S. lawmakers emulate the 
European dynamic interaction between antitrust and sector-specific 
regulation, while omitting dubious European policy decisions concerning 
network management. Practical scenarios for reform are suggested, such as 
allowing the FCC to monitor competition in broadband networks more 
closely. With a National Broadband Plan due in February 2010, the FCC 
should put effort into advancing these reform scenarios and take the 
opportunity to monitor competition more closely in broadband markets. 
This Article is intended to offer critical insight into the European 
telecommunications policy to benefit U.S. policymakers and academics. 
II. SOME NOTES ON NETWORK NEUTRALITY, NETWORK 
MANAGEMENT, AND EMERGING BROADBAND MARKETS 
Since the term was coined by Tim Wu in 2003,11 a heated 
interdisciplinary debate has evolved on network neutrality.12 At the core of 
                                                                                                                 
L.A. L. REV. 843 (1988); Fred S. McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation: 
Competition for and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401 (2003). 
 11. Tim Wu, etwork eutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003). 
 12. See Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet eutral?: Tim Wu and 
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2006) (providing an overview of the U.S. 
legal debate); see generally Robert D. Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, A ‘Third Way’ on 
etwork eutrality (Working Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1004522; David 
D. Clark, etwork eutrality: Words of Power and 800-pound Gorillas, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 
701 (2007); Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871 (2009); 
Jon Crowcroft, et eutrality: The Technical Side of the Debate ~ A White Paper, 1 INT’L J. 
COMM. 567 (2007); Rob Frieden, etwork eutrality or Bias?—Handicapping the Odds for 
a Tiered and Branded Internet, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171 (2006); Brett M. 
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the debate lies the question whether or not all content and service providers 
on the Internet should be treated equally by the network operators on 
whose networks they operate. This, in essence, is a principle of network 
architecture: the Internet was designed to treat all data packets sent between 
nodes on the network equally without discriminating between packets. In 
times of network congestion—too many packets going through a router at 
once—packets simply would “wait in line.” As a consequence, most 
control of Internet traffic is located at the network’s ends—its users. Users 
initiate packet traffic, and the network itself is a passive conduit.13 While 
this so-called end-to-end principle is the result of technological 
                                                                                                                 
Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, etwork eutrality and the Economics of an 
Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS 383 (2007); C. Scott 
Hemphill, etwork eutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation, 25 YALE J. 
ON REG. 135 (2008); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Product-
Line Restrictions with an Application to the etwork eutrality Debate, 19 INFO. ECON. & 
POL’Y 215 (2007); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: 
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 
(2001); Robert E. Litan & Hal J. Singer, Unintended Consequences of et eutrality 
Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 533 (2006); Moran Yemini, Mandated 
etwork eutrality and the First Amendment: Lessons from Turner and a ew Approach, 
13 VA. J.L. TECH. 1 (2008); Amit M. Schejter & Moran Yemini, “Justice and Only Justice, 
You Shall Pursue”: etwork eutrality, the First Amendment, and John Rawls’s Theory of 
Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMMM. TECH. L. REV. 137 (2007); J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-
Welfare Approach to etwork eutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 349 (2006) (providing an overview of economic studies on network neutrality); 
Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for etwork eutrality 
Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 329 (2007) [hereinafter “Towards an 
Economic Framework”]; Philip J. Weiser, The ext Frontier for etwork eutrality, 60 
ADMIN. L. REV. 273 (2008); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond etwork eutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 1 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, etwork eutrality and the Economics of 
Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006) [hereinafter “Economics of Congestion”]; Jay Pil 
Choi & Byung-Cheol Kim, et eutrality and Investment Incentives (CESifo Working 
Paper No. 2390, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1264934; Nicholas 
Economides & Joacim Tåg, et eutrality on the Internet: A Two-Sided Market Analysis 
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 07-40, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019121; Christopher S. Yoo, etwork eutrality, Consumers, and 
Innovation (U. of Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 08-23, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262845 [hereinafter “Network Neutrality, Consumers, and 
Innovation”]; Hsing Kenneth Cheng, Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay & Hong Guo, The Debate 
on et eutrality: A Policy Perspective (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=959944; Edward W. Felten, uts and Bolts of etwork eutrality, 
available at http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/neutrality.pdf (giving an overview of the 
network neutrality debate in network engineering); Mark A. Jamison & Janice A. Hauge, 
Getting What You Pay for: Analyzing the et eutrality Debate (Working Paper, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1081690. 
 13. David Isenberg, then at AT&T, in 1997 famously referred to the Internet as “dumb” 
in this matter. David Isenberg, Rise of the Stupid etwork, COMPUTER TELEPHONY 16 (Aug. 
1997): see also Rise of the Stupid Network, http://isen.com/stupid.html (Author provides 
links to article published on various Web sites.) (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).  
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developments in the initial stages of the Internet,14 it arguably also stems, to 
some extent, from early policy decisions by the FCC.15 Only the edges of 
the Internet were determined to be truly free from regulation by the FCC; 
hence, it was logical for innovation to take place there. In any case, the 
end-to-end principle has been defining the architecture of the Internet, and 
arguably constitutes the innovative character of the emergent Internet 
economy. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) reports that  
Ebay, Yahoo, Google and Amazon were able to enter their respective 
markets on a scale that was not possible before the Internet. The 
Internet has reduced barriers to large-scale market entry in many 
consumer markets and this has increased competition and consumer 
welfare across sectors. Now, some commentators are worried that a 
multi-tiered structure would introduce a new barrier to entry and stifle 
innovation at the edges.16 
Indeed, the end-to-end principle found its origins in the age of 
narrowband Internet, where most data packets are of approximately the 
same “weight” and timely delivery is not a necessity.17 The growth of 
broadband deployment, however, led to an increase in demand for high-
bandwidth applications and services like streaming video, which is 
sensitive to delay.18 It is argued, therefore, that absolute end-to-end 
connectivity may no longer be the most ideal principle for network 
architecture in the era of broadband, since unconditional end-to-end routing 
does not allow for distinguished handling of packets that require specific 
treatment.19 This would urge for a closer inspection of data traffic, which 
would create a more active network. Reasonable network management may 
be required to facilitate functional Internet usage on congested broadband 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, The ew etwork eutrality: 
Criteria for Internet Freedom, 12 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 225, 236 (2008); see generally 
J. H. Saltzer, D. P. Reed & D. D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277 (1984) (the seminal technical paper on end-to-end).  
 15. Particularly of interest here is the FCC’s distinction between “basic” and 
“enhanced” services as specified in Computer Inquiry II, which left the “enhanced” services 
unregulated. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs. (Second 
Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 417-29 (May 2, 1980). This 
eventually resulted in the separation of “telecommunications” and “information” services in 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act. See generally Joshua L. Mindel & Marvin A. Sirbu, 
Regulatory Treatment of IP Transport and Services, in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN 
TRANSITION: THE INTERNET AND BEYOND 59-64 (Benjamin M. Compaine & Shane 
Greenstein ed., 2001).  
 16. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Working Party on Telecomm. and Info. 
Servs. Policies, Internet Traffic Prioritisation:  An Overview 17 (Apr. 6, 2007). 
 17. See Christopher Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or 
Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 23, 30-34 (2004). 
 18. See, e.g., Crowcroft, supra note 12, at 574. 
 19. Id. 
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networks. In order to offer streamlined high-performance applications and 
services, it may be necessary to distinguish between packets of high and 
low priority,20 and allocate bandwidth more actively in case of congestion. 
However, allowing (deep) packet inspection and treatment based on that 
inspection can be much more far reaching than simple network 
management. Packet inspection for network-management purposes can be 
easily expanded to increase control over Internet traffic for economic or 
moral reasons, and violate competition on markets and civil liberties.21 
Indeed, the recent past has demonstrated that network operators have 
practiced unreasonable and disproportionate network management.22 Thus, 
a policy is needed to determine which forms of management are allowed on 
networks and which are not. A balance should be struck that allows the 
Internet to remain open while allowing network-management measures that 
ensure maximum quality of service (QoS).23 This Article does not draw a 
binary opposition between network neutrality and network management, 
but places network neutrality on a continuum between reasonable and 
unreasonable network management. 
A supposed optimal ratio between reasonable and unreasonable 
network management becomes more pertinent in relation to deployment of 
next-generation broadband infrastructures. Confronted with “digital 
divides” in knowledge economies, governments wish to push broadband 
deployment24 in a largely deregulated telecommunications landscape. 
Governments want to incentivize network operators to roll out next-
generation broadband infrastructures in previously underserved areas, 
preferably to develop these areas into a competitive broadband market.25 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See Felten, supra note 12, at 2-3; Jon M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating 
etwork eutrality, and the Quest for a Balanced Policy, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 644, 644-659 
(2007). 
 21. See generally Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1490 (2009) (discussing the relation between deep packet inspection and 
network neutrality); see also Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and its Impact on the 
etwork eutrality Debate and the Balance of Power between Intellectual Property 
Creators and Consumers (Working Paper, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=995273. 
 22. See Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
October 19, 2007. 
 23. For a more precise explanation of this balance, see JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET: AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008). 
 24. Compare Lennard G. Kruger & Angele A. Gilroy, Broadband Internet Access and 
the Digital Divide: Federal Assistance Programs, CRS Report for Congress (Mar. 19, 2009) 
(discussing the U.S. digital divide), with European Commission Communication on 
Bridging the Broadband Gap, at 7-8, COM (2006) 129 final (discussing the European digital 
divide).   
 25. See, e.g, Eur. Comm’n on Competition, Public consultations: Broadband Guidelines 
on the application EU state aid rules to public funding of broadband networks, (May 19, 
2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_ 
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These next-generation network operators, however, wish to recoup the 
tremendous fixed costs that come with infrastructure deployment through 
increased dominance over their own networks. As in any network industry, 
next-generation broadband networks are prone to network effects and 
falling into natural monopoly.26 Telecommunications regulators are thus 
confronted with possibly conflicting policy goals of increasing broadband 
deployment and desiring competitive and nondiscriminatory usage of those 
networks.27  
At the same time, next-generation broadband is an emerging market, 
in which any regulatory intervention (or lack thereof), necessary or 
otherwise, can have a tremendous impact on the state of the market.28 
Emerging markets in general can be defined as having “a significant 
(above-average) degree of uncertainty about the evolution of future 
demand.”29 More specifically, there are additional features that possibly 
can characterize emerging markets: first, emerging markets may be highly 
dependent on investment for dynamic efficiency; and, second, such markets 
may be more prone to the competitive harm of externalities such as  
network effects and switching costs.30 These possible, additional 
characteristics of emerging markets do not necessarily apply to the same 
extent: some emerging markets may be generally uncertain, but more 
dependant on investment than vulnerable to externalities and vice versa.31  
Intuitively, it seems plausible to assume that all aforementioned 
possible characteristics of emerging markets apply for the market of next-
generation broadband infrastructures; naturally, there is great uncertainty 
about future (bandwidth) demand in broadband, which is subject to intense 
                                                                                                                 
broadband_guidelines/ (advising European member states on incentivizing broadband 
deployment without breaking European state-aid laws). For an English translation, see also 
Community Guidelines for the Application of State Aid Rules in Relation to Rapid 
Deployment of Broadband Networks, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
consultations/2009_broadband_guidelines/guidelines_en.pdf. 
 26. For an overview of the basic economic principles of network industries and 
broadband, see generally JONATHAN NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP WEISER, DIGITAL 
CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 3-22, 134-
148 (2005). See also DANIEL F. SPULBER & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORKS IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND LAW 348-355 (2009) (analyzing the role of 
network effects in broadband networks). 
 27. See, e.g., Ernst-Olav Ruhle & Wolfgang Reichl, Incentives for Investments in ext 
Generation Access and Customer Choice: a Dichotomy?, 44 INTERECONOMICS 30, 30-40 
(2009) (providing a detailed description of the trade-off between fostering broadband 
deployment and a competitive broadband market). 
 28. Crocioni, supra note 7, at 502. 
 29. Id. at 497. 
 30. Id. at 498. 
 31. Id. 
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debate.32 Proponents of strict network neutrality regulation often stress the 
strong network effects in broadband markets,33 while skeptics emphasize 
the need to allow incumbents to recoup their investments to safeguard 
innovation.34 The assumption that all parameters of emerging markets 
apply to broadband, moreover, is echoed by a more or less neutral source—
the OECD.35 
The desired balance between reasonable and unreasonable network 
management thus is troubled by potentially incompatible policy goals and a 
market of above-average uncertainty. Policy and regulation in network 
management is, therefore, not to be taken lightly, and seems to require a 
dynamic approach that pivots between the various difficulties of the 
broadband marketplace.  
The debate on the appropriateness and feasibility of network 
management has taken place in the United States since the early twenty-
first century, but has only recently emerged in Europe. In what follows, 
network neutrality shall be related to telecommunications policy in the 
United States and Europe.  
                                                                                                                 
 32. For a detailed description of relevant issues in assessing future broadband demand, 
see Economics of Congestion, supra note 12, at 189-93. For the most conclusive research on 
the topic, see MINTS- Minnesota Internet Traffic Studies 
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/mints/home.php (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).  
 33. See, e.g., Towards an Economic Framework, supra note 12, at 329, 332. 
 34. See, e.g., etwork eutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, supra note 12.  
 35. See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Broadband Growth and Policies in 
OECD Countries: Ministerial Background Report (June 2008). The report stated the 
following: 
Broadband operators face uncertainty as to how to recoup their large investments 
in the absence of new revenue-generating broadband services and content. 
Content providers are waiting for improved connectivity and content protection. 
These mutual uncertainties have the potential to slow down investment in higher-
speed broadband networks and the generation of new broadband services. 
Id. at 96. The report later also announced, “OECD countries emphasise research and 
innovation in the fields of broadband infrastructure (e.g. networks, connecting technologies, 
system support products and testing), related applications (especially in the wireless area), 
broadband-enabled public services, digital broadband content and even R&D focusing on 
new broadband business models.” Id. at 131. The OECD report also went into detail on the 
importance of competitive markets: 
Maintaining a level-playing field and reducing anti-competitive practices in the 
face of high network effects and to promote consumer choice is crucial, i.e. in 
particular considering the increased use of walled garden approaches, as well as 
cross-industry mergers and acquisitions. With problems such as vertical 
integration, lock-in of consumers in certain standards, and poor access to certain 
content, an environment of contestable markets should be created where small and 
innovative players can compete. 
Id. at 15. 
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III. EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PATHS TO PRESENT-DAY 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 
A. A Brief History of U.S. etwork Management Regulation 
1. “The Past Is a Foreign Country”36 
In the course of the U.S. academic debate on network management 
and network neutrality, the history of U.S. telecommunications law has 
been described at such length that it can almost be deemed common 
knowledge.37 However, since the fall of 2008, there has been an increase in 
development that has, so far, only sparsely been documented.38 The Obama 
Administration has signaled a clear break with previous policy, and is 
currently in the process of revising regulatory oversight in 
telecommunications. Therefore, this Section will mainly focus on the most 
recent events in network-management policy, with special emphasis on the 
Comcast case,39 the Recovery Act and the FCC’s Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking on Preserving the Open Internet.40  
 Many have remarked that telecommunications networks in the United 
States have traditionally been regulated under common carrier 
requirements.41 All services falling under Title II of the 1934 
Communications Act were required, ex ante, to offer their services for a 
reasonable rate, at reasonable request, and without unreasonable price 
discrimination.42 These principles were more firmly established in the 
consent decree between the Department of Justice, Western Electric, and 
                                                                                                                 
 36. L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN 9 (1953). 
 37. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 12, at 886-923.  
 38. Compare David L. Sieradzki & Winston J. Maxwell, The FCC’s etwork eutrality 
Ruling in the Comcast Case: Towards a Consensus with Europe?, COMM. & STRATEGIES, 
4th Quarter 2008, at 73-88, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1374314 (discussing analogies between the FCC’s decision in Comcast 
and European policy), with Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation (Univ. of 
Colo. Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-02, 2009), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344757 (discussing the state of U.S. 
telecommunications policy after the Comcast decision).   
 39. See Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra 
note 1. 
 40. Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. 
63.638 ( Oct. 22 2009) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8).  
 41. See, e.g., Barbara Cherry, Misusing etwork eutrality to Eliminate Common 
Carriage Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 483 (2006); 
Crawford, supra note 12, at 878-84. 
 42. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(b) (2006). 
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AT&T,43 the three consecutive Computer Inquiries,44 and eventually the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which distinguished “information 
services” (Title I) from “telecommunications services” (Title II).45 The 
crucial difference between Titles I and II was that the latter covered mere 
transmission of signals (without modifying content) and was subject to 
common carriage requirements.46  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X,47 and the subsequent 
Wireline Broadband Order by the FCC,48 determined that both cable and 
DSL Internet services were subject to regulation as Title I (information 
services) under the Telecommunications Act, instead of under Title II. This 
Title I authority exempts cable and DSL operators from common carrier 
requirements under Title II; thus, network operators are not forbidden from 
implementing network-management practices that would constitute 
unreasonable discrimination under Title II.49 These actions marked a 
departure from sector-specific regulation into broad, ex post enforcement, 
which falls outside of the FCC’s hands. Aware of this situation, the FCC 
drafted a loosely formulated set of ex ante policy principles urging 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory behavior by network operators.50 
                                                                                                                 
 43. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68, 246 (D.N.J. Jan. 
24, 1956). 
 44. See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer 
and Commc’n Servs. & Facilities, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, para. 16-17  (1970); 
modified by Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 21 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1591 
(1971); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Second 
Computer Inquiry), supra note 15, at para. 1; Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the 
Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 
F.C.C.2d 958 (June 16, 1986), 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 603 (1986), modified by Amendment 
of Sections 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987). 
 45. 47 U.S.C § 153 (2007). 
 46. See Crawford, supra note 12, at 896-98. 
 47. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996 
(2005). 
 48. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, Report and Order and otice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005) 
[Hereinafter “Wireline Broadband Order”]. 
 49. Cf. Crawford, supra note 12, at 907. 
 50. The policy principles are as follows:  
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and 
interconnected nature of the public Internet, [1] consumers are entitled to access 
the lawful Internet content of their choice. . . . [2] consumers are entitled to run 
applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law 
enforcement. . . . [3] consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal 
devices that do not harm the network. . . . [4] consumers are entitled to 
competition among network providers, application and service providers, and 
content providers.  
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 
Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, para. 4 (2005) (emphasis omitted). 
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2. Present Developments: Comcast and the Recovery Act 
A fierce debate subsequently erupted as to whether or not the policy 
principles were actually enforceable.51 This debate was triggered by the 
infamous Comcast case, in which cable operator Comcast allegedly 
blocked peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol traffic on its network, regardless of the 
lawful or unlawful status of that P2P traffic.52 The FCC eventually 
determined that it had the jurisdictional authority under Title I of the 
Communications Act to disapprove of Comcast’s discriminatory 
practices.53 Comcast decided to bring a lawsuit contesting the FCC’s 
reasoning, which at the moment of writing is still pending in the D.C. 
Circuit.54 
The Comcast case is remarkable in that the very same FCC 
administration that was the force behind Brand X—which effectively 
deregulated pressing ex ante provisions on broadband networks55—seemed 
to have had a change of heart and determined that an arguably rhetorical set 
of policy principles that would undercut Brand X was enforceable on an ex 
ante basis after all. In the end, the FCC’s deregulatory approach, which was 
forcefully endorsed with Brand X, is under debate again,56 and might well 
tilt back towards sector-specific, ex ante regulation of broadband networks. 
This has become more likely with a new administration in office. 
                                                                                                                 
 51.  Compare Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, Petition to 
Establish Rules Governing etwork Management Practices by Broadband etwork 
Operators of Vuze, Inc. (2007) (urging the FCC to codify more strongly and subsequently 
enforce the Policy Principles against alleged unreasonable network management), and 
Comment Sought on Petition for Rulemaking to Establish Rules Governing Network 
Management Practices by Broadband Network Operators., Public otice, 23 F.C.C.R 343 
(January 14, 2008) (FCC opens formal comment process on the enforceability of the Policy 
Principles), with Comments of Hands Off the Internet, FCC WC Docket No. 07-52 
(received Feb. 13, 2008). 
 52. See Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Oct. 19, 2007) (discussing the Formal Compl. of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against 
Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer App’ns, Nov. 1, 2007).  
 53. See Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra 
note 1.  
 54. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2008). 
 55. For an apt observation of the FCC’s deregulatory agenda, see Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion in at’l Cable & Telecomm. Assoc. v. Brand X Internet Servs.: “Actually, 
in these cases, it might be more accurate to say the Commission has attempted to establish a 
whole new regime of non-regulation, which will make for more or less free-market 
competition, depending upon whose experts are believed.” 545 U.S. 967, 1005 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 56. See, e.g. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast 
Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
supra note 1,  FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Preserving the Open Internet, supra 
note 40.  
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On the campaign trail, then-Democratic presidential candidate Barack 
Obama stated that he would take “a back seat to no one in [his] 
commitment to network neutrality.”57 As president, Obama has 
underscored his commitment to network neutrality and broadband 
deployment in the Recovery Act.58 The much-contested American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act59 was drafted in response to the financial 
crisis of fall 2008 as an attempt to jump start the U.S. economy by boosting 
federal spending. The Recovery Act provides funding opportunities for a 
plethora of infrastructure projects, including deployment of broadband 
infrastructure in rural and underserved areas.60 Part of the broadband 
stimulus money attempts to strengthen the existing Rural Utilities 
Service,61 which is of little interest to this Article. More interesting is the 
BTOP Program.62  
The aims of the BTOP include providing and improving broadband 
access in underserved areas; providing broadband education and training to 
educational institutions, libraries, community support organizations, and 
outreach organizations that assist low-income, aged, unemployed, or 
otherwise “vulnerable populations”; improving use of broadband service by 
public-safety agencies; and stimulating economic growth.63 The BTOP is to 
be administered jointly by the FCC and the National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration (NTIA).64 Applicants can apply for a grant 
to pursue the above-mentioned goals and, in doing so, will be subject to 
contractual conditions of nondiscrimination as well as interconnection 
requirements.65 These requirements, crucially, will at least consist of the 
four principles of the FCC’s Policy Statement.66 Therefore, for all new 
broadband infrastructure developed under the BTOP, the Policy Statement 
will apply as a bottom line on an ex ante basis. This seems to imply that 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Barack Obama: On Net Neutrality (Nov. 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-mW1qccn8k (replaying a speech before Google 
employees in Mountain View, Calif., Nov. 2007).  
 58. Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). Congress has followed suit 
by reintroducing a network neutrality bill. See Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2009, 
H.R. 3458, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 59. Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. 
 60. For a helpful guide through the broadband related parts of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act, see S. Derek Turner, Putting the Angels in the Details: A Roadmap 
for Broadband Stimulus Success (2009), available at http://www.freepress.net/files/ 
Angels_in_the_Details.pdf. 
 61. 7 C.F.R. § 1738.1-1739 (2007). 
 62. Recovery Act, Title VI § 6001. 
 63. Id. at § 6001(b). 
 64. Id. at § 6001. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at § 6001(j); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, supra note 50, at para. 4. 
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network operators will have to give equal access to all content and service 
providers operating on their network, so that end users have access to “the 
lawful Internet content of their choice.”67  
Besides these obligations for applicants, the BTOP also requires the 
FCC to submit a “national broadband plan” to the appropriate House and 
Senate committees within a year of enactment of the Recovery Act.68 The 
ambitious goal of this plan is to “seek to ensure that all people of the 
United States have access to broadband capability and shall establish 
benchmarks for meeting that goal.”69 Moreover, the Act prescribes that the 
FCC analyze the most effective and efficient way to achieve this goal, 
strive for affordability of the offered broadband services, and continue to 
monitor actual broadband deployment under the BTOP.70  
Moreover, the FCC instantiated by the Obama Administration has 
initiated a formal rulemaking process with the intent to formally codify a 
rewritten version of the Policy Statement.71 The proposed rules add two 
additional principles of non-discrimination72 and transparency,73 while 
explicitly making the by-now six policy principles subject to “reasonable 
network management.”74 While the rulemaking process is still in its early 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. at para. 4.  
 68. Recovery Act § 6001(k)(1). 
 69. Id. at § 6001(k)(2). 
 70. Id. at § 6001(k)(2)(A)-(C). 
 71. See FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Preserving the Open Internet, supra 
note 40. For Policy Statement, see supra note 50. 
 72. See FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Draft Proposed Rules for Public Input, 
§8.13, supra note 40: “[A] provider of broadband Internet access service must treat lawful 
content, applications, and services in a nondiscriminatory manner.”Id. 
 73. Id. at §8.14: “[A] provider of broadband Internet access service must disclose such 
information concerning network management and other practices as is reasonably required 
for users and content, application, and service providers to enjoy the protections specified in 
this part.”Id. 
 74. Id. at §8.3: 
Reasonable network management consists of:  
(a) reasonable practices employed by a provider of broadband Internet access 
service to:  
(i) reduce or mitigate the effects of congestion on its network or to address 
quality-of-service concerns;  
(ii) address traffic that is unwanted by users or harmful;  
(iii) prevent the transfer of unlawful content; or  
(iv) prevent the unlawful transfer of content; and  
(b) other reasonable network management practices. 
The FCC motivates the catch-all category under (b) as follows: 
First, we do not presume to know now everything that providers may need to do to 
provide robust, safe, and secure Internet access to their subscribers, much less 
everything they may need to do as technologies and usage patterns change in the 
future.  Second, we believe that additional flexibility to engage in reasonable 
network management provides network operators with an important tool to 
experiment and innovate as user needs change. 
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stages, it seems that much of the effectiveness of the proposed rules and the 
FCC’s clout in enforcing these will depend on how “reasonable network 
management” will be further defined as the drafting process develops. In 
any event, the FCC’s proposal to formally codify the extended Policy 
Principles suggests that the FCC is intent to preempt the outcome of 
Comcast v. FCC
75 on the enforceability of the original Policy Statement, 
and increase regulatory oversight on the broadband market.    
The policy shifts in broadband during and in between the present and 
past administrations suggest a trial-and-error policy between categorical 
approaches, subject to a high degree of institutional learning.76 After a 
tradition of common carriage in telecommunications, broadband was 
heavily deregulated—supposedly to stimulate incumbents’ investment into 
broadband infrastructure deployment.77 With U.S. broadband deployment 
lagging behind other developed countries78 and a new administration in 
office, emphasis has shifted again to increased regulation, as evidenced by 
the BTOP and the FCC’s Proposed Rulemaking. Without speaking out in 
favor of either of these policies, it seems reasonable to state that any 
categorical approach refutes the status of broadband as a complex and 
uncertain market. As will be described in Section III of this Article, an 
optimal broadband policy allows regulation to pivot between spurring 
investment and dealing with externalities in a systematic and flexible 
mechanism. 
Even though the BTOP is administered by the NTIA and FCC, 
drafting the broadband plan offers the FCC unprecedented authority to 
outline policy for broadband deployment, including a detailed policy on 
network neutrality. Network-management policy in broadband markets is a 
daunting endeavor because of the potentially conflicting policy goals of 
incentivizing infrastructure investment and developing a competitive 
market—all of which happens in an environment of above-average 
uncertainty. The FCC has a rare opportunity to pursue such a daunting 
                                                                                                                 
See FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 40, at 
§140 
 75. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2008). 
 76. See Johannes M. Bauer & Erik Bohlin, From Static to Dynamic Regulation: Recent 
Developments in US Telecommunications Policy, 43 INTERECONOMICS 38, 50 (2008). 
 77. See FCC Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 48, at §3: 
We are confident that the regulatory regime we adopt in this Order will promote 
the availability of competitive broadband Internet access services to consumers, 
via multiple platforms, while ensuring adequate incentives are in place to 
encourage the deployment and innovation of broadband platforms consistent with 
our obligations and mandates under the [Telecommunications] Act. Id. 
 78. For a detailed report on decreasing growth in U.S. broadband deployment, see, for 
example, S. Derek Turner, America's Broadband Reality Check II: The Truth Behind 
America’s Digital Decline (2006), available at http://www.freepress.net/files/bbrc2-
final.pdf. 
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strategy and develop a comprehensive network-management policy in the 
United States. With this opportunity comes a great responsibility, which 
requires the FCC to be systematic yet flexible and, above all, transparent in 
drafting and implementing its national broadband plan.79  
Section III of this Article will offer recommendations on how to 
develop a comprehensive network-management policy based on analytical 
research and European precedent. European telecommunications regulation 
will be dealt with at length, since little research has been conducted on EU 
telecommunications policy from a U.S. perspective, and only scarce 
literature is available on how EU telecommunications regulation relates to 
issues in network neutrality and next-generation broadband deployment. 
B. European Telecommunications Regulation and etwork 
Management 
1. The Long Road to Open Markets 
The European telecommunications market traditionally consisted of a 
series of national monopolies held by incumbent state-owned operators.80 
By the late 1980s, the European Commission proposed a two-way strategy, 
which included (1) liberalizing and privatizing the telecommunication 
markets of individual member states and (2) creating a harmonized 
European internal marketplace for telecommunications.81 What followed 
was a deregulation of the sector, which allowed for further convergence of 
media and telecommunications and effective competition.82 
Thus, the European Commission drafted a completely new regulatory 
framework that was designed according to five main principles.83 The 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Initial reports indicate that the FCC is taking this role very seriously, as evidenced 
by the new Web portal, which includes a countdown timer.  Welcome to Broadband.gov, 
http://www.broadband.gov. 
 80. See, e.g. Christian Koenig, Andreas Bartosch, Jens-Daniel Braun, EC Competition 
and Telecommunications Law 51 (Kluwer Law International 2002). 
 81. A 1988 directive introducing competition in national telecom markets was the first 
directive pursuant of this dual strategy and, with that, the very first European Economic 
Community telecommunications law. See 1988 O.J. (L 131) 73-77. 
 82. See Commission Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, 
Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation, COM 
(1997) 623 (Dec. 3, 1997). 
 83. Id. These five principles are the following:  
(1) Regulation should be limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve clearly 
identified objectives. . . . (2) Future regulatory approaches should respond to the 
needs of users. . . . (3) Regulatory decisions should be guided by a need for a clear 
and predictable framework. . . . (4) Ensuring full participation in a converged 
environment. . . . (5) Independent and effective regulators will be central to a 
converging environment.  
Id. at 33. 
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framework contained three legal instruments—antitrust law, binding 
sector-specific regulation, and additional nonbinding sector-specific 
measures,84 which were implemented in six directives.85 This regulatory 
framework eventually was enacted in 2002, and has been under review 
since 2007.86  
The 2002 framework, in its broadest terms, can be characterized by 
three foundational strategies, of which the first two are closely related: (1) 
deregulation through decreasing ex ante regulation, (2) new regulation 
premised on the existence of significant market power (SMP), and (3) the 
principle of technological neutrality.87 The strategies of decreased ex ante 
regulation and SMP identification, especially, testify to the general market-
based approach that the European Commission has adopted for 
telecommunications policy.88 This market-oriented strategy has proven 
generally to be successful in many EU countries, where competition 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Antitrust law, naturally, was already in force outside of telecommunication-specific 
regulation, and it is not by coincidence that the framework has been built on top of forty 
years of jurisdiction in European antitrust law; this would underscore the general 
deregulatory and market-based approach in the new framework. See Alexandre de Streel, 
The Integration of Competition Law Principles in the ew European Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communications, 26 WORLD COMPETITION 489, 489-514 (2003); 
see also PIERRE LAROUCHE, COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION IN EUROPEAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2000) (providing a detailed explanation of European Union antitrust 
law in relation to telecommunications). 
 85. For a helpful scheme illustrating how directives coalesce, see Communication from 
the Commission Towards a New Framework for Electronic Communications Infrastructure 
and Associated Services, at 18 COM (1999) 539 final. The overarching Framework 
Directive outlines the relationship between the whole framework and National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) and balances the four underlying directives. See Council Framework 
Directive 2002/21/EC, art. 251, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33 [hereinafter “Framework Directive”]; 
see Council Access Directive 2002/19/EC, art. 95, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 7 [hereinafter “Access 
Directive”] (concerning interconnection and accessibility of communication networks); see 
Council Authorisation Directive 2002/20/EC, art. 251, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 21 [hereinafter 
“Authorisation Directive”] (codifying licensing and resource management); see Council 
Directive 2002/22/EC, art. 251, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 51 [hereinafter “Universal Service 
Directive”] (ensuring universal access and consumer rights); see Council Directive 
2002/58/EC, art. 251, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 [hereinafter “ePrivacy Directive”] (protecting 
privacy rights).  
 86. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission proposes a single European 
Telecoms Market for 500 million consumers (Nov. 13. 2007) available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1677&format=PDF&aged
=1&language=E&guiLanguage=en. 
 87. See Joshua Mindel & Douglas Sicker, Leveraging the EU Regulatory Framework to 
Improve a Layered Policy Model for US Telecommunications Markets, 30 TELECOMM. P’CY 
136, 137 (2006). 
 88. This latter parameter of technological neutrality will not be discussed at length in 
the present Article. For a detailed study on the matter, see ILSE MARTHE VAN DER HAAR, THE 
PRINCIPLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL NEUTRALITY: CONNECTING EC NETWORK AND CONTENT 
REGULATION (2008). 
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between numerous operators has lead to lower prices and an increase in 
both the number and speed of broadband connections.89  
The general premise behind the 2002 framework was that, in order to 
build and sustain a competitive telecom market in the EU, as much 
regulation as possible should be replaced by ex post application of antitrust 
law.90 Only when markets are considered insufficiently competitive is 
sector-specific regulation justified—and only until these markets become 
sufficiently competitive.91 The Framework Directive requires the European 
Commission to draft a recommendation with and for Member States’ 
independent NRAs.92 This recommendation is supposed to support a 
process of market analysis by NRAs to determine whether or not, in 
eligible markets,93 firms enjoy SMP.94 If market power is detected, NRAs 
are directed to Article 8.2 of the Access Directive, which enables the NRA 
to impose measures as diverse as obligatory transparency,95 
                                                                                                                 
 89. See, for instance, the OECD historical broadband penetration rates in countries like 
Finland and the Netherlands. OECD Broadband Portal, http://oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband; see 
also OECD, BROADBAND GROWTH AND POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES 24 (2008).  
 90. Cf. Framework Directive, supra note 85, at para. 27 (“It is essential that ex ante 
regulatory obligations should only be imposed where there is not effective competition, i.e. 
in markets where there are one or more undertakings with significant market power, and 
where national and Community competition law remedies are not sufficient to address the 
problem.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Comm’n Recommendation 2003 O.J. (L 114) 45, 45-47. 
 92. The independence of NRA’s from governments is established in the Framework 
Directive.  Framework Directive, supra note 85, at para. 11. 
 93. The European Commission generally favors the regulation of wholesale markets 
over retail markets because the latter’s level of competition is deemed to be mainly 
dependent on the competitiveness of the former market. See Framework Directive, supra 
note 85, at para. 26.  
 94. See Framework Directive, supra note 85, at arts. 15.1, 16.4. See also 2003 O.J. (L 
114) 45, supra note 91, at para. 16. This explanatory memorandum accompanying the 
recommendation offers a three-fold, cumulative scale to be used when assessing supposed 
SMP in telecom markets. First, it is to be identified whether a particular market is subject to 
“high and non-transitory entry barriers” for market entrants. Id. at para. 9. These barriers 
occur when incumbent operators impose asymmetrical conditions amongst market entrants 
on their network, or when required interconnection to complete a service is being hindered. 
The second—much less clearly defined—criterion is whether the market under suspicion is 
dynamic in such a way that it independently will tend toward effective competition over 
time. Id. This condition would apply in cases of fluctuating market shares and a high level 
of innovation—both characteristics of developing markets. The final criterion questions 
whether antitrust is sufficient to deal with the first two criteria. Id. After all, ex-ante 
regulation is only supposed to complement existing antitrust law. 
 95. See Access Directive, supra note 85, art. 9. 
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nondiscrimination,96 accounting separation,97 open access,98 and price 
control.99  
Thus, the 2002 framework operates through an elaborate mechanism 
of SMP identification to determine whether a specific market should be 
subject to sector-specific regulation. Only then are the framework’s 
strongest tools for regulatory intervention enforceable, and only until the 
market in question becomes competitive again. One of the provisions of the 
framework requires that the functioning of individual Directives be 
reviewed periodically, ensuring that regulation keeps up with technological 
development.100  
2. European Telecoms Under Review 
As technological progress and convergence have proceeded, the 
European Commission has signaled the need to update the regulatory 
framework in its entirety,101 stating that the European telecom market is 
still too fragmented to represent an internal, open marketplace.102 The 
proposed new framework is a significant revision of the 2002 original. Its 
direction could be interpreted as somewhat double sided because it grants 
more independent regulatory power to NRAs while, at the same time, 
attempting to strengthen the European Commission’s authority.103  
What followed by the end of 2008 was back-and-forth104 legislative 
drafting between the European Parliament,105 the European Commission,106 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. at art. 10. 
 97. Id. at art. 13. 
 98. Id. at art. 12. 
 99. Id. at art. 13. 
 100. See Framework Directive, supra note 85, art. 25. For the European Commission’s 
latest review of the Framework Directive, based on public consultation, see Commission 
Communication on the Review of EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Comm. 
etworks and Servs., at 3,  COM (2006) 334 final [hereinafter “Review of EU Regulatory 
Framework”]. 
 101. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Comm. Networks and Services, COM (2007) 697 final; Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal 
Serv. and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Comm. Networks, COM (2007) 698 final.   
 102. See European Commission Information Society, Reforming the Current Telecom 
Rules, available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/ 
index_en.htm.  
 103. While the European Commission intends to grant NRAs more authority to enforce 
structural separation of telecommunications operators, it has also proposed to let the 
European Commission have veto power in NRA’s market definition. Further, the European 
Commission wants to introduce a pan-European telecommunications regulator. See Impact 
Assessment, Commission Staff Working Document, PARL. EUR. DOC. (SEC 2007) 1472. 
 104. There are a great variety of legislative procedures in the EU, drawing on different 
power relations between Commission, Council, and Parliament. Drafting a new 
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the European Council,107 and again the European Parliament.108 
Disagreement among the three legislative branches concentrated on the 
possible codification of veto power for the European Commission, the 
enforcement of functional separation as a regulatory tool, and the 
legitimacy of the pan–European telecommunications regulator. However, a 
discussion on network neutrality led to unusual bickering between the 
European Parliament and Council. A row between the two institutions 
brought the negotiations process to conciliation committee, postponing 
adoption of the new telecommunications package until late 2009.109 The 
next Section shall address how the new European regulatory framework 
relates to network neutrality, and how network neutrality became a divisive 
issue in the drafting process of the new framework. 
3. Network Neutrality Under the New Framework 
The European Commission has followed the discussion on network 
neutrality in the United States closely and has attempted to develop a 
policy that translates network neutrality issues to the European market.110 
                                                                                                                 
telecommunications framework goes according to the so-called “co-decision procedure,” 
which is arguably the most transparent and democratic procedure available. See PAUL CRAIG 
& GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS, 109-118 (4th ed. 2008).  
 105. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament on a Common Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Comm. Networks and Servs., COM (2007) 697 (Nov. 13, 2007); 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on 
Universal Serv. and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Comm. Networks, COM (2007) 
698 final (Nov. 13, 2007). 
 106. See Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament Amending 
Directives 2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Comm. 
Networks and Servs., COM (2008) 724 final (Nov. 6, 2008); Amended Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 2002/22/EC 
on Universal Serv. and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Comm. Networks, COM (2008) 
723 final (Nov. 6, 2008).  
 107. See Council Common Position (EC) No. 16496/2008 of 9 Feb. 2009, art. 251; 
Council Common Position (EC) No. 16497/2008 of 9 Feb. 2009. art. 251.   
 108. See Recommendation for Second Reading on the Council Common Position for 
Adopting a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directives 
2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Comm. Networks and 
Servs., PARL. EUR. DOC. A6-0272 (SEC 2009) [hereinafter “PARL. EUR. DOC. A6-0272”]; 
Recommendation for Second Reading on the Council Common Position for Adopting a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directives 2002/22/EC 
on Universal Serv. and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Comm. Networks, PARL. EUR. 
DOC. A6-0257 (SEC 2009).  
 109. As of November 5, 2009 there appears to be agreement between the European 
Institutions about the new regulatory framework, although no definitive draft has been 
released yet. See EurActiv.com, EU telecoms reform package agreed, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/infosociety/eu-telecoms-reform-package-agreed/article-
187064?Ref=RSS. 
 110. In the European Commission’s wake, European academics have focused their 
studies on network neutrality. See generally Martin Cave & Pietro Crocioni, Does Europe 
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The European Commission has framed network neutrality explicitly in 
relation to the development of next-generation broadband infrastructure.111 
This is very much in line with the overall market-based approach that the 
European Commission has advocated in its past telecommunications 
policies.112 At the outset, the European Commission acknowledged the 
delicacy of regulating next-generation infrastructures, specifically, the 
complexity of balancing—under conditions of above-average uncertainty—
the potential conflict between incentivizing investment in broadband and 
fostering competition.113 Under these circumstances, a middle ground for 
future policy is proposed by the European Commission that opts for neither 
complete open access to next-generation networks, nor grants operators so-
called regulatory holidays on next-generation infrastructures.114 Rather, the 
European Commission intends to maintain and further develop the SMP 
mechanism of the existing regulatory framework: antitrust law triggers 
regulatory intervention in cases of demonstrated market failure, and all 
intervention is lifted once markets become competitive again.115 However, 
given the strong network effects of next-generation infrastructures, NRAs 
                                                                                                                 
eed etwork eutrality Rules?, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 669 (2007); Filomena Chirico, Ilse van 
der Haar & Pierre Larouche, etwork eutrality in the EU (TILEC Discussion Paper No. 
DP2007-030, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1018326; Viktória Kocsis & Paul 
W. J. de Bijl, etwork eutrality and the ature of Competition Between etwork 
Operators, 4 INT’L ECON’S & ECON. POL’Y 159 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=976882; Christopher T. Marsden, et 
eutrality: the European Debate, J. INTERNET L., Aug. 2008, at 1, 7-16; Christopher T.  
Marsden, et eutrality ‘Lite’: Regulatory Responses to Broadband Internet Discrimination 
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1330747; Andrea Renda, I Own the Pipes, You 
Call the Tune: The et eutrality Debate and its (Ir)relevance for Europe (2008), available 
at http://shop.ceps.be/downfree.php?item_id=1755; Peggy Valcke, et al., Guardian Knight 
or Hands Off: The European Response to etwork eutrality: Legal Considerations on 
Electronic Communications Reform, 72 COMM. & STRATEGIES 89 (2008). 
 111. See Impact Assessment, supra note 3, at 18-47. 
 112. Id. at 39-42. 
 113. Id. at 27. 
In policy terms, the issue is to strike a regulatory balance between, on the one 
hand, allowing incentives for investors in new core and access networks – in 
the face of considerable uncertainty over the evolution of demand for these 
services – and, on the other hand, avoiding the immediate foreclosure of new 
markets by sanctioning the reassertion of monopoly privileges by the dominant 
market players over these new infrastructures. Id. 
 114. See id. at 46: “A combination of infrastructure competition and regulation seems to 
produce the highest national broadband penetration rates.”Id. 
 115. Id., at 40: “Maintaining the current regulatory framework (Option 3) provides 
continuity and the opportunity to build on existing achievements.”; id. at 47:  
The Commission therefore considers that a modified Option 3 is the most 
appropriate option. The modification would be to add mandatory functional 
separation … as an exceptional measure available in the NRA's regulatory 
toolbox.” Id. 
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can, as a measure of last resort, functionally separate incumbent 
companies.116 
With this in mind, the European Commission’s stance on network 
management is much less articulated. Network neutrality is regarded as 
mainly a U.S. problem,117 and it is argued that the market in general is 
sufficiently competitive to solve unreasonable network management so that 
consumers who are unhappy with the discriminatory practices of their 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) can easily switch to an ISP that does not 
discriminate.118 In cases of unacceptable degradation of services and the 
blocking of lawful content, antitrust law and the regulatory framework are 
held to be appropriate remedies.119 This is supplemented with consumer-
protection measures, which impose transparency on network operators to 
disclose their network-management policies.120 
The European Parliament has been more active on network neutrality 
since reviewing the European Commission’s proposals, and has moved 
toward increased regulation that bans access restrictions on end users.121 
This has caused a dispute between the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers, the latter of which strongly opposed the proposed 
regulatory measures and deleted such amendments in its own amendments 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Impact Assessment, supra note 3, at 28-47. Functional separation is a lighter version 
of structural separation in which the incumbent’s next-generation network is turned into an 
operationally separate entity, yet acts under the ownership of the parent company. Id. at 29. 
 117. See Commission Staff Working Document on the Review of the EU Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Comm. Networks and Servs., PARL. EUR. DOC. (SEC 2006) 816 
(2006) at 26. 
 118. See Impact Assessment, supra note 3, at 91. 
 119. Id.; cf. Wong & Garrie, supra note 5, at 325-331 (providing a detailed account of 
how the 2002 European framework would deal with network neutrality concerns). 
 120. Network operators are required to inform their customers of any access limitations 
in advance of the conclusion of a contract and regularly thereafter. This measure of 
transparency should encourage users to switch ISPs when they are unsatisfied with any 
(lawful) discriminatory activities. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Serv. and Users’ Rights 
Relating to Electronic Comm. etworks, COM (2007) 699 final (Nov. 13, 2007); Impact 
Assessment, supra note 3, at 95-96. 
 121. This came to the forefront most clearly in the by-now infamous amendment 138, 
stating that 
no restriction may be imposed on the fundamental rights and freedoms of end-
users, without a prior ruling by the judicial authorities, notably in accordance with 
Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on 
freedom of expression and information, save when public security is threatened in 
which case the ruling may be subsequent.  
(internal quotations omitted). PARL. EUR. DOC. A6-0321/138 (2008). This amendment is 
striking since it takes network neutrality out of the European Commission’s strict economic 
context and into European Fundamental Rights such as Freedom of Expression. Id.  
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to the bill.122 Because the European Parliament subsequently reintroduced 
its network neutrality amendment in its second reading of the bill,123 both 
institutions were forced into a conciliation procedure, postponing adoption 
of a new regulatory framework for telecoms until an agreement is 
reached.124 
The contours of the definitive new regulatory framework seem to be 
agreed upon while an agreement is all but finalized.125 Concerning network 
neutrality, the legislative procedure of the framework evidenced a cautious 
approach by the European institutions. Communication by the European 
Council and the European Commission suggests that European 
policymakers are uncertain whether network neutrality is or will become an 
issue on the European market, or whether it is not (yet) enough of an issue 
to put the SMP-centered regulatory approach under discussion in 
telecoms.126 Thus, network neutrality is dealt with in terms of the existing 
procedure of the regulatory framework, in which regulatory action is taken 
only in cases of SMP. European regulators have chosen to take this wait-
and-see approach, apparently arguing that, for now, antitrust law and the 
regulatory framework are sufficiently robust to deal with future network 
neutrality issues. 
A practical result of the upcoming revised version of the European 
regulatory framework for telecommunications is that, through the bickering 
between the European Commission and Parliament on one side and the 
Council of Ministers on the other, little effort has been put into 
harmonizing network management for the internal market. As such, 
network neutrality will be approached as a matter of consumer 
protection.127  
                                                                                                                 
 122. See Council Common Position, supra note 107; Directive 2002/21/EC, OJ L 108 
(24.4 2002).  
 123. See PARL. EUR. DOC. A6-0272, supra note 108, at 28; Press Release, European 
Parliament, No Agreement on Reform of Telecom Legislation (May 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20090505IPR55085/20090505IP
R55085_en.pdf. 
 124. See Presidency Press Statement on the State of Play Regarding the ‘Telecoms 
Package,’ Council of the European Union (June 11, 2009), available at  
http://www.eu2009.cz/en/news-and-documents/news/presidency-press-statement-on-the-
state-of-play-regarding-the-_telecoms-package_-25123/. 
 125. See supra note 109. 
 126. See Wong & Garrie, supra note 5, at 332 (“The prevailing view is that the existing 
European legislative framework is sufficient to deal with conflicts arising between network 
and cable providers and therefore, does not necessitate the types of regulations anticipated in 
the United States.”). 
 127. PARL. EUR. DOC. A6-0321/138, supra note 121. 
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The European framework offers a rich suite of tools for regulatory 
intervention on telecom markets that are not sufficiently competitive.128 
While these measures are all adequate methods to discipline network 
operators who violate network neutrality principles as an abuse of market 
dominance,129 it is unlikely that they will be implemented in a uniform 
manner throughout the continent. Different national implementations of 
pan-European policy are inevitable with the nature of a directive as a 
legislative instrument130 and the way European governance is generally 
organized. However, the emerging, next-generation broadband market is 
likely to reveal such stark differences in (de)regulatory approaches between 
various member states and that the internal market may be jeopardized,131 
which is the ultimate goal of European telecommunications policy.132  
In sum, there are some relevant points of critique that can be brought 
against the new European regulatory framework and the way it deals with 
network neutrality issues. The compromise bill that will emerge from the 
conciliation committee, as with many European compromises, is likely to 
illustrate the conflicts between the federalist (Commission) and 
sovereignist (Council) branches in EU governance, with an activist 
Parliament in between.133 The proposed legislation takes a wait-and-see 
approach to network neutrality and network management, in contrast to the 
active role European institutions have played in discussing broadband 
deployment. Network management is not dealt with in much detail, which 
suggests that the European Commission is afraid to take bold steps to 
influence markets with a coordinated network neutrality policy. This rigid 
wait-and-see stance may not be the preferred approach for dealing with 
network management of next-generation broadband as an emerging market. 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Examples of these tools include imposed transparency, nondiscrimination, open 
access and local loop unbundling, price control, and structural separation. See Access 
Directive, supra note 85.  
 129. But see Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 12, at 416-420 (providing an 
exposé on the theoretical possibility of network neutrality violation outside of market 
dominance). 
 130. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 
1, 278 (“A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member 
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form 
and methods.”); cf. CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 104, at 279 (“Sometimes the provisions 
of a directive represent a compromise between Member States on a complex or sensitive 
matter and in respect of which certain discretionary options are left open to States.”). 
 131. See Chirico et al., supra note 110, at 49 (analyzing how particular access tiering on 
broadband infrastructure is likely to fragment the European internal broadband market). 
 132. See Commission Directive 88/301, art. 90, 1988 O. J. (L 131) 73-77 (EEC). 
 133. See generally NEIL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (MacMillan 1995) (1989) AND IAN BACHE & STEPHEN GEORGE, POLITICS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (Oxford UP, 2006) for an overview of the relation between the European 
Institutions and their federalist/sovereignist leanings. 
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IV. TOWARDS DYNAMIC BROADBAND POLICY 
This Section will critically evaluate recent policy that concerns 
network neutrality in Europe and the United States. Preceding sections 
have discussed recent developments in U.S. broadband and network 
management policy, which have developed following successive 
categorical approaches that have been subject to a high degree of 
institutional learning. European broadband policy turns out to be more 
systematic and analytical, in which regulatory intervention is only triggered 
in cases of market failure. On an anecdotal level, in broadband deployment, 
this European policy has been quite successful compared to the U.S. 
approach. This is reflected in the latest OECD figures on broadband 
deployment,134 in which the United States ranks fifteenth out of twenty-
nine countries in broadband penetration, performing worse than nine EU 
countries. 
OECD Broadband Subscribers Per One-Hundred Inhabitants by 
Technology, December 2008 
 
This graph also shows that new EU member states, such as the Czech and 
Slovak republics, have an equally large or larger percentage of fiber/LAN 
(next-generation) broadband connections than the United States.135  
This Article will test, by means of theoretical modeling, the 
assumption that European policy has encouraged broadband penetration. A 
venture into antitrust theory will analyze how European and U.S. network 
neutrality policies relate to regulatory errors, which have significant effects 
on market development. It has been established that, in emerging markets, 
such as broadband, errors are not only more likely to occur, but will also 
                                                                                                                 
 134. OECD Broadband Portal, Broadband Penetration, Historical Time Series Dec. 
2008, available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband/ (Access main portal and 
download at chart 1m.); see also Communication from the Commission on Preparing 
Europe’s Digital Future i2010 Mid-Term Review, at 4, COM (2008) 199 final (Apr. 17, 
2008). 
 135. OECD Broadband Portal, Percentage of Fibre Connections in Total Broadband 
Among Countries Reporting Fibre Subscribers Dec. 2008, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/ 
broadband/ (Access main portal and download at chart 1l.). 
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have graver consequences than in established markets.136 Thus, testing how 
EU and U.S. network-management policies relates to regulatory errors is a 
good indicator of how effective these policies are in achieving the 
potentially conflicting goal of increased competitive, nondiscriminatory 
broadband deployment.  
The outline of this final Section will be as follows: First, this Section 
begins by examining antitrust theory and defining the characteristics and 
costs of regulatory errors. Second, these issues will then be related to 
broadband as a specific type of emerging market, which requires a flexible 
regulatory apparatus that is able to pivot between dealing with specific 
errors, instead of categorically focusing policy on one error specifically. 
Even though European policymakers are dealing with network neutrality in 
a way that does not fit with broadband as a specific emerging market, the 
overall contours of European telecoms regulation is better equipped to deal 
with regulatory errors than U.S. policy. However, obligated to draft a 
national broadband plan under the Recovery Act,137 the FCC has the 
opportunity to develop a dynamic and flexible mechanism for network 
management similar to the European framework, but better. 
A. Antitrust Under False Positives and False egatives 
More than other legal disciplines, (U.S.) antitrust scholarship has 
developed a tradition of identifying and evading two common errors: false 
positives (Fp) and false negatives (Fn). These two errors originate in the 
statistical sciences, where they are commonly labeled as “type one” (Fp) 
and “type two” (Fn) errors.
138 A type-one error designates a false null 
hypothesis that is mistakenly labeled true; whereas, a type-two error is a 
true null hypothesis that is mistakenly labeled false.139 Following the same 
mechanism, and as demonstrated in Table 1, a false positive emerges when 
restrictive antitrust is imposed on a competitive market, thus offering a 
solution to a problem that does not (yet) exist. A false negative, on the 
contrary, emerges when antitrust law that is too lenient is imposed on a 
market that is not sufficiently competitive.140 
Table 1: False Positives and False egatives in Antitrust Law 
 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See Crocioni, supra note 7. 
 137. See Recovery Act § 6001(k)(1)-(2). 
 138. Some studies in law and economics also use the type one/type two terminologies. 
The present Article however will refer to the two errors as false positives and false 
negatives.  
 139. See, e.g., R.S. Radford, Statistical Error and Legal Error: Type One and Type Two 
Errors and the Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843 (1988) (implementing the statistical 
distinction between type one and type two errors in legal scholarship). 
 140. See McChesney, supra note 10, at 1411-18. 


















This distinction suggests that a safely competitive market requires 
little enforcement of antitrust law and, that when markets do not function 
properly, strong antitrust policy is needed to correct market failure. In the 
statistical sciences, type-one and type-two errors operate on a continuum—
by decreasing the chance for type-one errors, the chance of type-two errors 
increases and vice versa. Moreover, type-one errors generally are 
considered to be the greater evil.141 In law, both the “weight” of the errors 
and their inverse relation has been subject to more debate, which has been 
particularly prominent in antitrust scholarship.142 
A traditional analysis of false positives and false negatives in antitrust 
law would conclude that social costs involved with the former are much 
higher than the latter.143 In the case of a false positive, regulation will add a 
cost to otherwise efficiently functioning markets, while there also will be 
costs involved in turning back these “bad laws.” Conversely, the costs of 
false negatives are considered low. For example, a false negative arises 
when a retail DSL reseller is subjected to a price squeeze by the wholesale 
operator upstream,144 which has been determined judicially to fall outside 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Type-one errors are overtly gullible; whereas, type-two errors are overtly skeptical. 
In science, the latter is naturally preferred over the former. See Radford, supra note 139, at 
851. 
 142. See McChesney, supra note 10, at 1412. 
 143. Id. at 1412-13. 
 144. A price squeeze can emerge when the wholesale firm is vertically integrated into 
the retail sector, while other retailers rely on the wholesaler to supply the goods they sell 
themselves. The wholesale operator can squeeze these competing resellers out of the market 
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the scope of antitrust law.145 If no additional remedies are imposed here, 
there will be a cost to society. However, under the traditional rationale, this 
cost will eventually be mitigated through market entry by competitors, 
which will, in turn, drive down the retail price. Thus, the market will 
alternatively self-correct without intervention (and cost). Note that this 
rationale only works if there are no entry barriers to the market. Thus, in 
order to prevent a false-positive error, it would be best to focus on 
eliminating entry barriers. Sticking with the same example, if the wholesale 
DSL operator controls an essential facility, and there is not sufficient 
intermodal competition from cable or wireless broadband, the market will 
not be able to self-correct.146 There are high entry barriers here, which need 
to be neutralized. 
This analysis is grounded in Chicago School law and economics,147 
and was prominent in scholarship, policymaking, and judicial lawmaking 
between the 1970s and the early 2000s. Chicago School theorists strongly 
spoke out against false positives while arguing for a permissive approach to 
false negatives. After all, under the Chicago School rationale, false 
negatives would self-correct eventually, while false positives only could be 
                                                                                                                 
by simultaneously raising wholesale prices for the resellers while dropping its own retail 
prices to customers. See Dennis L. Weisman, Access Pricing and Exclusionary Behavior, 72 
ECON. LETTERS 121, 121-22 (2001); but see J. Gregory Sidak, Abolishing the Price Squeeze 
as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 279 (2008) (providing a 
critical view of the role of price squeeze in antitrust law). 
 145. This example is analogous to the U.S. Supreme Court’s February 25, 2009, ruling in  
Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Comm., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109 (2009); see also Brief of 
Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Linkline Comm., Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 07-512) 
(academic discussion of Linkline while still at intermediate level). 
 146. A similar reasoning was developed by the European Court of Justice in its ruling in 
Case C-202-07, France Télécom v. Comm’n, at para. 112 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/:  
[T]he lack of any possibility of recoupment of losses is not sufficient to prevent 
the undertaking concerned reinforcing its dominant position, in particular, 
following the withdrawal from the market of one or a number of its competitors, 
so that the degree of competition existing on the market, already weakened 
precisely because of the presence of the undertaking concerned, is further reduced 
and customers suffer loss as a result of the limitation of the choices available to 
them.  
Id. (emphasis added). It is interesting to compare this judgment with the Supreme Court’s 
Linkline case. See 129 S.Ct. 1109. 
 147. For an eloquent expression of the Chicago rationale regarding false positives and 
false negatives, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-3 
(1984): 
Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract entry. True, this 
long run may be a long time coming, with loss to society in the interim. The 
central purpose of antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long run. But this 
should not obscure the point: judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-
correcting, while erroneous condemnations are not.  
Id. 
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the result of unnecessary intervention in markets.148 The Chicago School’s 
bias against false positives in antitrust culminated in the question of 
whether there should be antitrust laws to begin with,149 and has lead to a 
cautious interpretation of antitrust law by courts. In telecommunications-
related cases, this was most clearly demonstrated in Trinko, where the 
Supreme Court was permissive of false-negative errors, and stressed 
evading false positives as a main motivation for its decision.150  
The Chicago School’s dominance in antitrust scholarship has been 
under attack since the early 2000s, mainly due to criticism of Chicago’s 
tolerant approach to false negatives.151 This new current of antitrust 
scholars argues, in essence, against categorical antitrust rulings, and 
attempts to debunk the danger of false positives while pointing attention to 
the danger of false negatives.152 Not only are false positives less prevalent 
than suggested by Chicago School scholars, but, in the end, the social costs 
of false negatives might be higher than false positives.153  
                                                                                                                 
 148. See McChesney, supra note 10, at 1413-14. 
 149. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
(1978); Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and 
onstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1994); Easterbrook, supra note 147; 
compare Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer 
Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 2003, with Jonathan B. 
Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 2003. See generally 
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. 
McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995). 
 150. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 414 
(2004) (“The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 
[Communications Act] liability.”); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (“Thus, mistaken inferences in cases such as this one 
are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to 
protect.”). 
 151. See Joseph P. Bauer, Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing the Antitrust 
Laws: Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 303 (2004); Joseph 
P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust 
Injury and Standing, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437 (2001); Peter C. Carstensen, False Positives in 
Identifying Liability for Exclusionary Conduct: Conceptual Error, Business Reality, and 
Aspen, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 295 (2008); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law 
and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009); Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. 
Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207 (2008).  
 152. This new wave of antitrust study was joined by the great Alfred Kahn, who referred 
to Justice Scalia’s reasoning on the costs of false positive errors to categorically exceed false 
negatives in Matsushita as a “bromide that fails to differentiate between the initiation of 
price competition from the response that punishes and suppresses it and restores the status 
quo ante.” Alfred E. Kahn, Telecommunications: The Transition from Regulation to 
Antitrust, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 159, 172 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 153. False negative errors may lead to overlooked dynamic efficiency problems, as 
competitors are in fact disincentitivized to enter the market Cf. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 
151, at 703.  
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The Chicago School’s studies rightly point out that economic 
determinism is present in traditional antitrust doctrines. However, in the 
absence of empirical proof, the Chicago School’s scholars’ claims are 
incomplete, and will need to be supplemented by extensive empirical 
research. For a start, nonetheless, it is a worthwhile exercise to identify 
three basic premises underlying Chicago’s assumptions on false positives 
and false negatives in antitrust: (1) courts very often commit false-positive 
errors in antitrust litigation; (2) false positives in antitrust law have a 
detrimental effect on efficient market behavior; and (3) unregulated 
markets are efficient.154 Criticizing these premises as overtly categorical is 
valid and persuasive on an anecdotal level.155 Moreover, drawing attention 
to the danger of allowing too many false negatives in antitrust is 
pertinent.156 
However, in order to develop an effective rebuttal to the antitrust 
regime, which fights false positives at the risk of false negatives, it is 
necessary to criticize the Chicago School on its own strong suit—
grounding legal conclusions in economic analysis. In general, there seems 
to be a desire to update Chicago’s assumptions on antitrust law, but the 
new wave of U.S. post-Chicago antitrust scholars seems to be ill-equipped 
to meet this demand. Interestingly, while the ratio between false positives 
and false negatives seems to be of little interest to European regulators and 
antitrust scholars,157 the most constructive work in law and economics on 
balancing the two errors beyond the Chicago School’s approach may 
actually be European.  
Indeed, Pietro Crocioni’s elaborate study concerns mitigating the 
abuse of dominance in emerging markets, which are particularly prone to 
false-positive and false-negative errors. Because of the general uncertainty 
that characterizes next-generation broadband as an emerging market, not 
only is there a greater risk for false-negative and false-positive errors to 
occur, but also the consequences of these errors in terms of market 
foreclosure are much greater.158 It is worthwhile, therefore, to arrive at 
more precise taxonomy of the risks and costs associated with the two types 
of errors in the different kinds of emerging markets, allowing for more 
tailored network-management policymaking in emerging markets such as 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See Carstensen, supra note 151, at 309-21. 
 155. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 151, at 1260. 
 156. See Carstensen, supra note 151, at 321. 
 157. See, e.g., Renato Nazzini, The Microsoft Case and the Future of Article 82, 
ANTITRUST, Spring 2008, at 59, 63 (“In the EU, the European Commission and the 
Community Courts have rarely, if ever, engaged in a discussion of the risk of false positives 
or false negatives as a factor shaping enforcement policy or legal rules.”). 
 158. See Crocioni, supra note 7, at 451. 
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broadband. This approach, moreover, bridges false positives and false 
negatives in antitrust with similar regulatory errors. 
A key contribution of Crocioni’s study lies in its critique of the 
seamless offsetting of false-negative and false-positive costs in the first 
place. Through theoretical modeling, the author demonstrates that—at least 
in a static setting—both costs are of an altogether different nature and, thus, 
cannot be offset as effortlessly as often assumed.159 False-negative costs 
concern a deadweight loss of added price above marginal costs that are 
easily quantifiable;160 whereas, false-positive errors lead to hypothetic loss 
in innovation, which is more difficult to quantify precisely.161 Whereas 
false-negative costs are mainly backward looking, measuring the costs of 
false positives is a forward-looking exercise. This calls into question any 
categorical assumption about the compared costs of both types of errors 
and, specifically, criticizes the Chicago School’s premise of false-positive 
costs to be substantially higher than false-negative costs under all 
circumstances.162  
Rather, these results suggest that, instead of categorical policy, a more 
precise weighing of false-negative and false-positive costs, based on the 
particulars of an (emerging) market, is in place. This is valid in both 
                                                                                                                 
 159. The models assume a wholesale essential facility monopolist, who caters to a 
competitive retail market downstream, in which it is also vertically integrated—as is often 
the case in telecoms. See id. at 453. Note that the models do not account for intermodal 
competition between adjacent wholesale operators of different infrastructures. For a detailed 
study on offsetting intermodal and intramodal competition in telecommunications and 
broadband, see Spulber & Yoo, supra note 26, at 152-86. 
 160. In this model, the absence of antitrust intervention in a noncompetitive market leads 
to rent-seeking behavior by the wholesale monopolist. Consequently, an increase in price 
and decrease in quantity lead to a quantifiable deadweight cost even further above marginal 
cost. See Crocioni, supra note 7, at 503-04. 
 161. In case of unjustified antitrust, the monopolist is disincentivized to improve his or 
her service, which leads to a loss of improvement that would be valued by consumers. The 
upward movement of the linear demand curve, which is supposed to occur under normal 
circumstances, does not take place; this implies a welfare loss. See id. at 504-05. 
 162. Crocioni’s critique is supported by more extensive modeling conducted by LEAR, 
which concludes that 
[i]t is true that market power may not last forever and that entry of new firms or 
technological change may drastically challenge even a well-established dominant 
position. However, there is no clear-cut explanation of why bad rules take longer 
to be reversed than the time required by markets to correct the anticompetitive 
effects of abusive conducts, nor has any empirical evidence so far been brought 
forward to sustain this conjecture. 
PAOLO BUCCIROSSI, GIANCARLO SPAGNOLO & CRISTIANA VITALE, LABORATORIO DI 
ECONOMIA, ANTITRUST, REGOLAMENTAZIONE (LEAR), The Cost of Inappropriate 
Interventions/on Interventions Under Article 82, at § 6.38 (2006) (providing an economic 
discussion paper prepared for the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading). For the 
modeling affirming this statement, see annexes C, D, and E for nonspillover assumptions, 
spillover assumptions, and their effect on ancillary markets, respectively. Id. at annexes C-
E. 
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antitrust and regulatory settings. An emerging market, in which detrimental 
network effects are more problematic than a dependence on innovation and 
investment,163 suggests an approach in which false-negative errors are 
evaded at the risk of false-positive errors.164 After all, restrictive policy will 
be more effective in guarding against the welfare loss of a noncompetitive 
market. Conversely, when a market is highly dependent on investment for 
dynamic efficiency and less prone to negative network effects,165 an 
approach in which false positives are avoided at the cost of false negatives 
is needed.166 In order to prevent foreclosure of innovative markets 
involving significant fixed costs, regulators might grant more leeway to 
monopolists in order to safeguard innovation in the long run. In an 
emerging market only characterized by above-average uncertainty167—
often the case in very new markets—it is advised that antitrust authorities 
take a wait-and-see approach until it can be determined whether 
enforcement should focus on a specific type of error.168 The most complex 
situation arises when all three features apply: (1) above-average 
uncertainty, (2) dependence on innovation and investment, and (3) strong 
network effects.169 In this case, “middle ground remedies” are preferred, 
which  
cater to some extent for possible competition concerns but not to the 
fullest extent, allowing some incentives for [the monopolist] to 
innovate and invest. An example could be imposing as a remedy an 
obligation to supply without requiring that [the essential facility] is 
supplied at cost. However, this approach could be more suited to a 
regulatory type of intervention than under competition law.170 
Thus, the most complex emerging markets call for a flexible 
regulatory mechanism, supplemental to antitrust law, which is able to pivot 
between fighting false-negative and false-positive errors, depending on 
which type of error carries the largest cost in a specific situation. This 
suggests that broadband, as a complex emerging market,171 is in need of a 
dynamic interplay between evading false-positive and false-negative costs, 
as both have a clear effect on the market, but not necessarily at the same 
time and to the same extent under all scenarios. In order to minimize social 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Crocioni, supra note 7, at 498. 
 164. Id. at 510. 
 165. Id. at 498. 
 166. Id. at 511. 
 167. Id. at 498. 
 168. Id. at 507. 
 169. Id. at 498. 
 170. Id. at 512. 
 171. As previously defined, next generation broadband is subject to above-average 
uncertainty, highly dependent on investment and innovation, and prone to network effects. 
See supra notes 32-35. 
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costs, as previously suggested, a regulatory mechanism should provide 
flexibility, allowing lenient or restrictive intervention in the broadband 
market depending on whether the danger of a specific type of error is more 
apparent in a given situation.  
The following and final section argues that the theoretical premises 
underlying the European framework for telecommunications have the 
potential to function according to this flexible principle, yet fail to do so in 
network neutrality policy. By contrast, recent U.S. policy has switched 
between categorical approaches to deregulating and re-regulating 
broadband, which may lead to regulatory uncertainty. Therefore, this 
Article recommends that U.S. lawmakers implement a flexible and 
dynamic regulatory mechanism of network management for its domestic 
broadband market. 
B. etwork Management Under False Positives and False 
egatives 
The broadband market is too complex and uncertain to benefit from a 
categorical approach to (de)regulation. Rather, any intervention should be 
flexible and adaptive to specific circumstances. Because broadband, as an 
emerging market, is subject to above-average uncertainty, prone to network 
effects, and dependent on investment, but not necessarily to the same 
extent at all times, antitrust law and regulation should be applied flexibly 
and on a case-by-case basis.172 This does not, of course, rule out the 
possibility of erroneous intervention or erroneous restraint, but at least 
offers a mechanism that attempts to strike a balance between avoiding 
false-negative and false-positive errors in a transparent manner that benefits 
firms, consumers, and regulators.  
European telecommunications law has the potential to function 
according to this principle. However, with network neutrality, European 
policy does not live up to this potential. As will be demonstrated herein, the 
European wait-and-see stance on network neutrality advances an incorrect 
definition of broadband as an emerging market, which is not congruent 
with the overall European policy in next-generation broadband deployment. 
By expanding Table 1 into Table 2, this Article illustrates how the 
European regulatory framework works in regulating next-generation 
broadband deployment.  
As long as the market is competitive, only antitrust law applies.173 
This is the default position in EU telecommunications policy (C1). Under 
                                                                                                                 
 172. The appropriateness of a case-by-case approach in dealing with network neutrality 
issued is echoed in the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which is a promising sign. 
See Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices supra note 40, at §134. 
 173. See Framework Directive Recital 27, supra note 85. 
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this scenario, there is supposed to be effective competition between 
broadband operators, and no reported abuse of vertical dominance on 
specific infrastructures. If, through a review process by member states’ 
NRAs, competition authorities, or by the European Commission’s own 
research, there turns out to be a market failure or abuse of dominance,174 
the possibility of a false negative arises (Fn). This situation could occur if 
an operator of next-generation broadband networks is not penalized for 
abusive conduct under antitrust law because a national regulatory or 
competition authority fears impeding investment by making false-positive 
errors.175 In this case, the regulatory framework with sector-specific 
measures, which is supposed to correct the market failure at hand and deal 
with detrimental network effects, when needed, can be put into motion.176 
This naturally leads to situation (C2)—justified intervention in case the 
particular broadband market is not sufficiently competitive.177 Note that the 
trap of false positives (Fp) logically does not apply in this model. After all, 
it is inherent to the European mechanism that no sector-specific regulation 
is imposed if the market is deemed to be sufficiently competitive, and all 
regulatory intervention is lifted once markets develop sustainable 
competition. By effect, the error with the greatest cost in terms of 
innovation and investment (Fp) is avoided, while the mechanism of the 
framework works such that problematic externalities are targeted by sector-
specific regulation.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 174. With the aid of the Commission Recommendation on telecommunications markets 
subject to ex ante regulation, see , 2003, O.J. (L 114) 45 supra note 91, at 45-47. 
 175. For instance, this was the case in Germany. To stimulate former incumbent 
Deutsche Telekom to roll out the VDSL infrastructure in 2006, the German government had 
planned to impose minimal regulation on incumbent Deutsche Telekom, effectively 
abandoning nondiscrimination. This prompted a dispute between the German government 
and the European Commission. See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Comm’n Launches “Fast 
Track” Infringement Proceedings Against Germany for “Regulatory Holidays” for Deutsche 
Telekom (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=IP/07/237&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; see also 
Pierre Larouche, Europe and Investment in Infrastructure with Emphasis on Electronic 
Communications (TILEC Discussion Paper No. DP 2007-031, 2007). 
 176. See Access Directive, supra note 85. 
 177. In case of the Deutsche Telekom example, supra note 175, functional separation of 
the incumbent VDSL company would be a possible option. See supra note 116 for a 
discussion on functional separation.   
Table 2: False-Positive and False-egative Errors in the 
European Framework for Telecommunications 
112 FEDERAL COMMUICATIOS LAW JOURAL [Vol. 62 
 
This scheme highlights the efficiency of the European regulatory 
framework for telecommunications, and the potential promise this 
mechanism shows in regulating next-generation broadband. As previously 
demonstrated, broadband is a particular emerging market that is generally 
subject to above-average uncertainty and equally characterized by a 
dependence on investment and a vulnerability to externalities, such as 
network effects.178 These market characteristics suggest a vulnerability to 
false-negative and false-positive errors,179 both of which have negative 
consequences on the further development of next-generation broadband. 
European institutions more or less follow this rationale in developing 
policy to stimulate next-generation broadband deployment. It is recognized 
that, while network operators should be given at least some leeway to 
recoup their investments in next-generation infrastructure, and avoid false-
positive errors for this reason. Nonetheless, the available regulatory tools 
are expanded with functional separation of incumbents’ “regular” and 
“next-generation” operations in case the costs of false-negative errors 
exceed the costs of false-positive errors.180 
However, European institutions have failed to follow the same 
rationale when formulating policy on network neutrality. Besides increased 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See Crocioni, supra note 7. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Cf. Impact Assessment, supra note 3, at 27-29. 
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consumer protection laws,181 lawmakers seem inclined to avoid developing 
explicit network neutrality policy and unsure as to the extent that network 
neutrality will be an issue in the European market.182 This supports a 
general wait-and-see approach to network neutrality. Because this issue has 
yet to develop, any regulatory intervention would be premature.183 When 
following the aforementioned definition of emerging markets, this wait-
and-see approach suggests an understanding of broadband as an emerging 
market subject to above-average uncertainty only.184 This is the case in 
very new emerging markets, which indeed justifies a very prudent approach 
to intervention.185 However, the wait-and-see stance to network neutrality 
does not square with the general European approach to developing next-
generation infrastructure, in which it is—rightly—recognized that 
broadband is subject to above-average uncertainty, prone to network 
effects, and is highly dependent on investment.186 This state of the market 
requires a dynamic approach to offset investment dependence and negative 
externalities by flexible regulation, which clearly is not what the European 
institutions plan to do with network neutrality.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that, while the European regulatory 
framework has a latent potential to address network neutrality in the 
systematic and flexible manner that is required, it fails to transform this 
potential into actual policy. Returning to the state of affairs in the United 
States, a different situation arises. With Brand X came a deregulatory 
approach to broadband markets, which, through Comcast, the BTOP of the 
Recovery Act, and the FCC’s Proposed Rulemaking, is under debate again. 
When analyzing these shifts in policy alongside the framework of false 
positives and false negatives, it turns out that the broadband regulatory 
practices of the previous administration focused mainly on false-positive 
traps, at the cost of increasing the likelihood of false negatives. This is also 
the strategy employed by the Supreme Court in Trinko187  and Brand X.188 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. at 95-96. 
 182. See Review of EU Regulatory Framework, supra note 100, at 32. 
 183. This was echoed by an open letter from prominent European academics. See Martin 
E. Cave, et. al., Statement by European Academics on the Inappropriateness of Imposing 
Increased Internet Regulation in the EU (Jan. 8, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1329926; cf. Wong & Garrie, supra note 5, at 339 (“the existing 
regulations under . . . the Access and Interconnection Directive means that that scenario of 
access tiering between network operators and application providers may appear remote.”). 
 184. See Crocioni, supra note 7. 
 185. Id. at 507. 
 186. See supra note 120. See also Pierre Larouche, Europe and Investment in 
Infrastructure with Emphasis on Electronic Communications, TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 
2007-31 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020899. 
 187. See Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 
415 (2004) 
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Common carriage regulation was deemed to hold back otherwise 
competitive markets, with great costs involved. This resulted in a stronger 
reliance on antitrust law, as both DSL and cable would fall outside the 
scope of sector-specific Title II regulation.189  
Commentators argue that this method decreases false-positive errors, 
while also acknowledging that such a strategy typically works on a trial-
and-error basis with a high degree in institutional learning.190 Moreover, the 
deregulatory approach directly after Brand X supposes a market structure 
of workable competition.191 After all, theoretically, only in a competitive 
setting will committed false-negative errors be self-corrected by the 
market.192 Academics have since voiced compelling critique against this 
Chicago School rationale,193 which has been validated by actual modeling 
efforts.194 It turns out that any categorical approach to (de)regulating 
broadband markets is ill advised. Rather, in an emerging, uncertain, and 
complex market, such as broadband, a flexible policy that pivots between 
focusing on false positives and false negatives is likely to be most 
successful. However, through the Comcast case195 and the Recovery Act,196 
a theme has developed in which regulatory oversight is increased—
constituting a more categorical focus on tackling false-negative errors. 
Under the given circumstances, it is unclear whether, for next-generation 
broadband, these regulatory initiatives would constitute a false positive (Fp) 
or a correct intervention to market failure (C2); again, the only way to find 
out is through trial and error. Moreover, it could be argued that, particularly 
in the Recovery Act, there is a higher risk of a false-positive trap because 
the proposed ex ante measures apply on a very broad basis.197  
What may be emerging is a pattern by which old categorical 
approaches are replaced by new ones. Indeed, it has been stated that the 
                                                                                                                 
 188. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 
(2005). 
 189. See 47 U.S.C § 253 (2007). 
 190. See Bauer & Bohlin, supra note 76, at 50. 
 191. See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 48. See Also Bauer & Brolin, id., at 49: 
“Although it was not explicitly invoked in policy debates, the US approach toward NGN 
follows the logic of this method. When the new regime was put into place, the anticipated 
future market structure was one of workable competition.” Id. 
 192. See McChesney, supra note 10, at 1412-13. 
 193. For an overview of this critical scholarship, see supra note 147. 
 194. See Buccirossi, Spagnolo & Vitale, supra note 162; see also Crocioni, supra note 7. 
 195. See Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra 
note 1. 
 196. See Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 197. For a compelling argument against blanket ex-ante rules in network management 
issues, see etwork eutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, supra note 12. 
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FCC has a long-standing tradition in categorical rulemaking,198 and has 
developed a habit in which disputes are mitigated on a “legislative-like 
basis, with a limited track record in handling adjudications and expedited 
proceedings under a rule-of-law model.”199  
Thus, instead of categorical policy depending on trial and error, U.S. 
regulators need a more analytical mechanism to monitor broadband 
markets, analogous to the European system previously described. The main 
modification of recent policy would be a larger role for the FCC in 
administering competition in broadband markets. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has repeatedly voiced its discomfort with administering competition in 
telecommunications through judicial lawmaking in antitrust.200 Rather, the 
role of monitoring the competitiveness in U.S. broadband markets should 
be entrusted to the FCC, similar to the role played by the Directorates 
General for Competition and Information Society in the European 
Commission. Indeed, the idea of charging the FCC with increased antitrust 
oversight over the broadband market is not new and has been argued 
convincingly by others.201 This Article has attempted to strengthen this 
argument by outlining the analytical grounds under which an agency like 
the FCC could implement a comprehensive strategy in network 
management and broadband deployment.  
Interestingly, the Recovery Act endorses such a role for the FCC. 
After all, as specified in the Act, the FCC is obligated to draft a National 
Broadband Plan.202 In this plan, the FCC could draft an analytical model in 
                                                                                                                 
 198. See Weiser, supra note 12, at 311. 
 199. Id. at 318. 
 200. See, e.g., Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 
398, 415 (2004) (quoting Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in eed of 
Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1990): “No court should impose a duty to 
deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise. The problem should be 
deemed irremedia[ble] by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the court to 
assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory agency.”); accord Pacific Bell 
Tel. Co. v. Linkline Comm., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109 (2009):  
It is difficult enough for courts to identify and remedy an alleged anticompetitive 
practice at one level, such as predatory pricing in retail markets or a violation of 
the duty-to-deal doctrine at the wholesale level. . . . And courts would be aiming 
at a moving target, since it is the interaction between these two prices that may 
result in a squeeze. 
Id. at 1121 (emphasis in original). 
 201. See, e.g., Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 12, at 2; Kahn, supra note 152; Joseph 
Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: 
Towards a Convergence Of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 85 (2003); cf. Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: 
An Institutional Perspective on the et eutrality Debate, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 
L. 19, 21 (2009) (arguing for network neutrality rulemaking to be administered by the 
Department of Justice and FTC). 
 202. Recovery Act § 6001(k)(2). 
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which procedures for market monitoring are delineated and specifies a 
string of tools for regulatory intervention in case market failure is detected 
in these developing broadband infrastructures. Like the European 
regulatory framework, such a mechanism would allow for correction in 
case of a false-negative error, while evading the false-positive trap 
altogether. Sector-specific intervention would only be applied in case of 
demonstrated market failure. Similarly, as in the EU, any regulatory 
measure should be evaluated on a continuous basis, and be lifted as soon as 
robust competition allows.203 
This approach has the benefit of being flexible and analytical at the 
same time—allowing for a tailored approach in network neutrality issues 
that is also transparent and straightforward. Such a mechanism would pivot 
between generic antitrust law and regulatory intervention based on 
necessity. The “pivoting player” would be the FCC. Network neutrality is a 
topic too delicate to fall under antitrust law or sector-specific provisions per 
se. At the same time, there is a great benefit to precedent-setting through 
transparent and systematic policy at the FCC. The outlined European 
approach to antitrust-triggered regulation for broadband offers exactly that, 
and would offer the promise to rule out regulatory errors that have plagued 
U.S. telecommunications policy for ages.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, a comparative analysis has been developed between 
European and U.S. policy in next-generation broadband and network 
management. After a brief description of current problematic issues of 
network neutrality and the characteristics of broadband as a complex 
emerging market, a critical summary of the most recent events in U.S. 
policymaking was present. Furthermore, European telecommunications 
policy has been addressed at length. This analysis was meant to evaluate 
the process towards the regulatory framework of 2002 and its current 
revision, which was designed as a mechanism in which antitrust law and 
sector-specific regulation interact. The effectiveness of this mechanism can 
be demonstrated both empirically and theoretically in terms of next-
generation broadband deployment. However, the European institutions 
have failed to recognize the potential of their own regulatory framework in 
dealing with network neutrality. In a complex and emerging market, such 
as broadband, only a dynamic and flexible regulatory mechanism will 
minimize regulatory errors. Therefore, U.S. policymakers, and, 
particularly, the FCC, should pay close attention to developments in 
Europe. While there are, indeed, notable problems in European broadband 
                                                                                                                 
 203. See 2003 O.J. (L 114) 45, supra note 91. 
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policy, the European approach may offer the necessary regulatory tools to 
boost the United States’ digital future. The FCC and the Obama 
Administration are strongly advised to develop a National Broadband Plan 
according to European precedent that embraces workable competition, so 
that a reliable and neutral broadband Internet can reach as many Americans 
as possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
